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Abstract 
This paper examines statins competition in the Spanish pharmaceutical market, 
where prices are highly regulated, and simulates a situation in which there is 
unrestricted price competition. A nested logit demand model is estimated with a 
panel of monthly data for pharmaceuticals prescribed from 1997 to 2005. The 
simulation indicates that the regulation of prices is similar in its effects to 
cooperation among producers, since the regulated prices are close to those that 
would be observed in a scenario of perfect collusion. Freedom to set prices and a 
regulatory framework with appropriate incentives would result in a general 
reduction in prices and may make the current veiled competition in the form of 
discounts to pharmacists become more visible. The decrease in prices would be 
partially offset by an increase in consumption but the net effect would be an overall 
decrease in expenditure. The counterfactual set-up would also lead to important 
changes in the market shares of both manufacturers and active ingredients, and a 
reversal of generic drugs. Therefore, pro-competitive regulation would be welfare-
enhancing but would imply winners and losers. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to aging of the population and the inclusion of expensive new products, drug 
expenditure is one of the fastest growing components of health expenditure in most 
countries. Since the regulation of the market and certain cost containment measures 
have not been totally successful in reducing prices, knowing more about drug 
competition could be very useful for pharmaceutical policy makers.  
Although Spain has allowed the introduction of generic drugs since January 1997, 
that is, drugs that are bioequivalent to brand-name medicines (i.e., their efficacy and 
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safety are essentially the same) that enter the market when the patents on the 
original drugs have expired, there is only limited price competition. The 
pharmaceutical market is highly regulated and prices are driven mainly by 
modifications and revisions of the regulations.  
Therefore, the Spanish case allows a study of competition between pharmaceuticals 
and also simulations of equilibrium prices in situations without price restrictions or 
with a regulatory framework with appropriate incentives. The main purpose of this 
paper is to analyse demand for statin drugs and to perform a counterfactual exercise 
in price competition à la Bertrand. The comparison between the real and the 
counterfactual situations allows me to evaluate modifications of the strict price 
regulations in terms of welfare and winners and losers.  
This new empirical evidence from Spain, which is one of the largest markets for 
pharmaceuticals in the European Union (EU) and the seventh largest worldwide, 
could be applied to a great number of countries with similar institutional settings 
and pharmaceutical market characteristics: heavy price regulation and low 
penetration of generic drugs. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section explains the main features of 
the Spanish pharmaceutical market. The third section describes the dataset. The 
section after that presents the demand and supply models, and the simulation 
procedure. The fifth section shows the estimation issues and results. The sixth 
section presents the simulation results. The section after that discusses the results 
and the last section offers the concluding remarks. 
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2. The Spanish pharmaceutical market 
The Spanish NHS is funded from tax revenue and provides health care services to 
all residents. The health care management system is decentralized and regional 
authorities control expenditure and organize health service provision. However, the 
central government regulates pharmaceutical prices.  
Although the NHS provides health care, there are copayments for prescribed 
pharmaceuticals. The standard rate of copayment is 40%, but the average 
copayment is less since prescription drugs for pensioners and some other specific 
groups, such as the handicapped or people who have suffered occupational 
accidents, and their dependents, have no charge, and drugs indicated for chronic 
diseases have a rate of only 10% (with an upper limit). The actual average 
copayment for prescribed pharmaceuticals is very low and accounts for less than 7% 
of the total expenditure on ambulatory prescription pharmaceuticals.  
Another important feature is that there are a great number of different presentations 
of drugs. In fact, there are three types of prescription drugs in Spain: original brand-
name drugs (which might be marketed either by the patent holder or by a licensee), 
copy brand-name drugs and generics. This is due to the fact that, although Spain 
joined the European Patent Convention in 1986, it did not grant product patent 
rights until 8 October 1992 due to a transitional period in accordance with Article 
167 of that convention. Before this date, there were only process patents.  
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Although generic drugs were introduced into Spain in 1997, the market share for 
generic medicines was low at the end of the period analysed (14.60% in units and 
7.90% in value) (IMS Health, 2006b).  
The average price of drugs in Spain is low in comparison to that of other EU 
countries but the average brand prescription price has risen, due mainly to drugs 
that have been introduced recently at high prices (Costa-Font and Puig-Junoy, 
2005). These new high prices may be a strategy to avoid parallel trade, since the low 
prices for older medicines has led to the Spanish market becoming an important 
source of parallel trade within the EU. 
Although Spain was a relatively low-price country with limited generic penetration, 
in December 1999 a reference pricing system was introduced for off-patent drugs 
with the same active ingredient. Reference pricing has gradually been extended to a 
growing list of active chemical ingredients. All versions of off-patent drugs, branded 
and generics, were included in their respective group of bioequivalent drugs once 
there was at least one generic version of the respective active ingredient. The 
reference price was determined endogenously as a function of drug prices in the 
relevant market: for each group a reference price was calculated as the weighted 
average selling price of the lowest-priced drug accounting for at least 20% of the 
market (year on year)1. This system established the maximum price that could be 
reimbursed by the NHS for any version of the same drug. Whenever the price of a 
                                                 
1 If the difference between this price and the highest price for the group was less than 10%, the 
reference price was the result of applying a 10% reduction to the highest price. If the difference 
between the calculated price and the highest priced product was more than 50%, the reference price 
was exactly 50% of the highest priced product. Whatever the situation, the reference price was 
never lower than the price of the cheapest generic (López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). 
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prescribed drug was higher than the reference price, patients could opt for the 
prescribed drug by paying the difference between its price and the reference price. 
However, since January 2004 the reference price has been calculated as the average 
of the three lowest costs per day of treatment, for each form of administration of an 
active ingredient, according to its defined daily dose2 (DDD). With this system, if 
prescriptions specify drugs priced higher than the reference price, pharmacists are 
obliged to substitute them for the cheapest generic version. However, if 
prescriptions specify drugs whose price is equal to or lower than the reference price, 
pharmacists are not obliged to substitute them. When the prescription has been 
written using the name of the active ingredient, the pharmacist has to dispense the 
lowest-priced generic drug. In this way, reference pricing has become a system for 
establishing the maximum reimbursement price that a drug may have without being 
excluded from the list of publicly financed drugs, that is, a kind of price capping 
system. 
Moreover, the maximum ex-factory price for all drugs (branded and generics) is set 
during the process of obtaining market approval, and usually the introduction price 
remains the maximum price for most of the life of the product (Borrell, 2003). The 
Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs is responsible for negotiation with firms. 
The funding conditions setting and wholesalers’ and retailers’ mark-ups are also 
regulated.  
                                                 
2 A defined daily dose is the average dose per day in adults for a drug when it is used to treat its 
main indication. 
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The government uses a peculiar form of cost-based price regulation for branded 
drugs in which manufacturing, marketing and research costs, as well as an industrial 
profit on invested capital, are allocated to new drugs. However, this is rarely the 
final price since the legislation allows other factors to be considered such as the 
price of the same product in other European countries, the price of drugs that can 
be considered substitutes or the therapeutic innovation of the medicine. In fact, the 
legal criterion is that the price has to reflect the therapeutic value of the drug as well 
as the cost of comparable treatments, the price of the same drug in other countries, 
and some other political issues such as the contribution to the national economy 
(Antoñanzas et al., 2007).  
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, in Spain, public expenditure on 
prescription medicines represented slightly more than 22% of public health 
expenditure in 2005, and that between 1997 and 2005, the public expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals increased by almost 117%. 
3. Data 
The dataset consists of monthly consumption records of prescription statins from 
1997 to 2005. The information was provided by the Directorate-General of 
Pharmacy and Health Products at the Spanish Ministry of Health and Consumer 
Affairs, and is complemented with data from the Nomenclator Digitalis of the NHS 
Health Information Institute (Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, 2005) and from the 
Base de Datos del Conocimiento Sanitario 2005 - BOT PLUS (Consejo General de 
Colegios Oficiales de Farmacéuticos, 2005). 
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The analysis is focused on outpatient consumption of oral prescription drugs 
containing only one active chemical ingredient. As Table 1 shows, the sample 
includes 19 markets for six active ingredients from the group of statins (HMG CoA 
reductase inhibitors). The active ingredients included are all those commercialized in 
Spain during the period analysed: atorvastatin, cerivastatin, fluvastatin, lovastatin, 
pravastatin and simvastatin. However, cerivastatin (marketed in Spain as Lipobay®, 
Liposterol®, Vaslip®, and Zenas Micro®) was withdrawn from the market in 2001, 
due to international reports of safety issues.  
These drugs are lipid modifying agents that are used to lower high cholesterol levels 
in people with or at risk of cardiovascular disease. In fact, they are the most potent 
cholesterol-lowering agents available. The reduction in total cholesterol levels that 
these drugs are responsible for, and especially in levels of low-density lipoprotein 
(LDL) cholesterol (commonly known as "bad cholesterol"), implies an important 
decrease in the number of cardiac events, such as heart attack or sudden cardiac 
death, and a considerable reduction of the risk of stroke. For this reason, statins are 
widely prescribed and among the most sold drugs worldwide. 
Lovastatin, simvastatin, pravastatin and fluvastatin entered the market before 
January 1997. Lovastatin was the first statin marketed in Spain; in 1990. In 1991, 
simvastatin and pravastatin were commercialized. Fluvastatin entered the market in 
1996. The first sales of atorvastatin and cerivastatin appear in the dataset in 
November 1997 and August 1998, respectively.   
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Table 1 also shows the specific indications of each active ingredient3, the date of 
entry of the first generic (in those markets with generic entry before the end of 
2005), and the date of the implementation of the reference pricing system (for those 
markets in which this system of reimbursement was applied). 
This dataset is not a sample but the whole outpatient market for these drugs: all 
statin drugs sold in Spain and financed (at least partially) by the NHS. The panel is 
unbalanced since atorvastatin and cerivastatin entered in the market after January 
1997 and different presentations entered the market at different times. There are, 
however, observations for at least 56 months for cerivastatin, 98 for atorvastatin and 
108 for the remaining active ingredients. There are a total of 10,981 observations for 
64 producers.  
The different active ingredients have several strengths (quantity of active ingredient 
per unit) and are sold in different package sizes (number of units); therefore, all the 
quantities sold are converted into common units. For each presentation I calculate 
the total number of milligrams of the active ingredient and transform this into 
patient days using the DDD; that is, I calculate the total number of DDDs per 
package4. Prices are calculated from the dataset by dividing volume of sales in euros 
(€) by the number of DDDs sold: the price per DDD for each product.  
                                                 
3 The indications for the prescription of statins have broadened over the years, to include for 
instance the preventative effects of statin use in specific risk groups, such as diabetics (Collins et al., 
2003). 
4 I use the DDD of each active ingredient established by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology. The use of this international standard dose 
enables standardisation and comparison drug quantities across therapeutic groups, active 
ingredients and presentations. 
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Finally, I calculate the market size as the population who have high cholesterol and 
therefore, could potentially receive a prescription for a statin. To calculate this 
potential market I use the number of individuals reported to have been diagnosed 
with high cholesterol in the 2003 Spanish National Health Survey (Encuesta Nacional 
de Salud). I assume the percentage of population with high cholesterol to be constant 
over the years analysed and I multiply this percentage by the Spanish population and 
the number of days in each month. In this way I obtain the number of DDDs 
potentially consumed. 
4. Empirical framework 
Two of the most important drivers of pharmaceutical competition are the 
introduction of new active ingredients for similar indications and the introduction of 
generic drugs. As mentioned, generics were introduced into Spain in 1997. These 
products contain the same active chemical ingredient as the original product and 
have proven bioequivalence5, to the satisfaction of health authorities. However, the 
producer and some characteristics such as colour, shape, inactive ingredients or 
packaging may be different. Therefore, generics may be considered substitutes for 
the brand-name drugs but not perfect substitutes; in other words, there is some 
degree of product differentiation.  
                                                 
5 The WHO defines two pharmaceutical products as bioequivalent if they are pharmaceutically 
equivalent or pharmaceutical alternatives, and they display comparable bioavailability, when studied 
under similar experimental conditions. Bioequivalence is considered proven if the bioavailabilities, 
in terms of peak and total exposure after administration of the same molar dose under the same 
conditions, are similar to such a degree that the effects of the studied products can be expected to 
be essentially the same. 
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The expected result of generics entering the market is an increase in the level of 
competition in the market and a reduction in the prices and market shares of brand-
name products. It is also expected that when the number of manufacturers 
producing generics in the market is considerable, prices will tend towards the 
marginal cost of production. However, for brand-name products, the literature in 
the US shows some evidence of price increases after the entry of generics (for 
instance Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; or Frank and Salkever, 1997): this has been 
called the “Generic Paradox” (Scherer, 1993). 
Product differentiation is greater if not only the producer, colour, shape, inactive 
ingredients or packaging are different, but so too is the active ingredient. Indeed, 
each statin has its own characteristics and entered the market at a different time. For 
instance, statins may be classified into fermentation-derived and synthetic. The first 
group includes lovastatin, pravastatin, and simvastatin; the second atorvastatin, 
cerivastatin, and fluvastatin.  
The LDL-lowering potency also varies from one active ingredient to another. 
Cerivastatin was the most potent, followed by atorvastatin, simvastatin, lovastatin, 
pravastatin, and fluvastatin. A comparison of the efficacy of atorvastatin, 
simvastatin, pravastatin, lovastatin, and fluvastatin at reducing LDL and total 
cholesterol in patients with hypercholesterolemia, found that atorvastatin was the 
most effective without increasing adverse effects (Shepherd et al., 2003). Finally, the 
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statins analysed are generally well-tolerated and show similar levels of adverse effect, 
although the newer statins have a higher ratio of efficacy to adverse effect6. 
Therefore, the statin group is formed of branded and generic medications that 
compete with other close but not perfect substitute medications. Thus, defining the 
relevant market is not easy and although it is an imperfect approach, some authors 
(for instance, Aronsson, Bergman and Rudholm, 2001; Dalen, Strøm and Haabeth, 
2006; and Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy and Borrell, 2009) take the therapeutic active 
ingredient level according to the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) 
classification as the relevant market. I follow this approach to define markets but, in 
order to tackle the non-linearity of the prices of differently sized presentations and 
to take advantage of variation between markets and products to identify parameters, 
I use the product (active ingredient with a specific dosage and size from each 
manufacturer) as the element of analysis.  
Demand 
In the pharmaceutical industry the institutional setting is very important and the 
dispensing process is quite complex; the physician, the pharmacist, the third-party 
payer and the patient each play a role. I assume that the physician and the 
pharmacist are perfect agents for the patient and that their choice, together with that 
of the patient, maximizes utility for the patient.  
                                                 
6 The risk of myopathy is lowest with pravastatin and fluvastatin probably because they are more 
hydrophilic and as a result have less muscle penetration. Lovastatin induces the expression of gene 
atrogin-1, which is believed to be responsible in promoting muscle fibre damage (Hanai et al., 
2007). 
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The dispensing process follows a multi-level market structure, as shown in Figure 
1. The first choice is between dispensing a statin or prescribing an alternative 
treatment, such as exercise, a change of diet, homeopathic products or even a drug 
from another related therapeutic subgroup such as fibrates, bile acid sequestrants or 
nicotinic acid and its derivatives. In fact, prescription guidelines usually require that 
the patient has tried a cholesterol-lowering diet before starting to use statins. 
If the statin subgroup is chosen, the next step is to decide between the active 
ingredients based on the medical record of the patient and possible intolerance to 
some active ingredients. The third decision is to choose a specific presentation from 
all the possibilities for the active ingredient, in other words, to choose the strength 
of the product and the package size, given the difference between the actual and 
targeted cholesterol level, as well as the characteristics of the patient. 
The next stage is the choice between branded and generic drugs. Hellerstein (1998) 
found that physicians play an important role in determining whether patients receive 
brand-name or generic pharmaceuticals and that some are more likely to prescribe 
generics while others are more likely to prescribe branded products. Coscelli (2000) 
found that in addition to the physician, the patient’s characteristics also affect the 
prescription decision.  
When the physician prescribes a brand-name or generic product, there is also a 
choice between different manufacturers. In fact, as well as the physician and the 
patient, the pharmacist may participate in the choice of the drug, for instance 
choosing which product containing the given active ingredient to dispense. The 
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choice at this stage is mainly based on which products are available at the pharmacy. 
Finally, the third-party payer may affect the decision by implementing obligatory 
substitution rules and requirements limiting reimbursements, such as the reference 
pricing system.  
To analyse this market I use a structural discrete-choice model of product 
differentiation. In this model utility for consumers depends on product 
characteristics and individual tastes, firms are modelled as price-setting oligopolists 
and endogenous market outcomes are derived from an assumption of a Nash 
equilibrium in prices. This kind of random utility model has been applied to a great 
number of products such as ready-to-eat cereals (Nevo, 2000a and 2001), yogurts 
(Di Giacomo, 2008), movies theatres (Davis, 2006) and vehicles (Berry, Levinsohn 
and Pakes, 1995; Verboven, 1996; or Petrin, 2002). They have also been used to 
analyse demand for pharmaceuticals by several authors such as Stern (1996), 
Cleanthous (2004), Dalen, Strøm and Haabeth (2006), Iizuka (2007), Yu and Gupta 
(2008), Kaiser, Mendez and Rønde (2010) and Coronado (2010).  
As my interest is not only in competition between drugs containing the same active 
ingredient, but also between drugs with different active ingredients, I use a nested 
logit model based on Berry (1994)7. In contrast to the simple multinomial logit 
model, the nested logit model allows consumer tastes to be correlated across 
products. Indeed, there is correlation between the idiosyncratic shocks between 
products of the same segment of the market. This counters the “independence from 
                                                 
7 An alternative approach is the multistage budgeting model applied by Ellison et al. (1997) to 
analyse the demand for cephalosporins. 
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irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) property and allows for reasonable substitution 
patterns.  
In comparison to the random coefficients model8, the nested logit model may be 
sensitive to the specification of the nest structure because the researcher chooses 
the options that are potentially close a priori9. However, in the case of 
pharmaceuticals this problem does not jeopardize the nested logit model since it is 
possible to use the ATC classification to build the structure of the nests10. It seems 
reasonable to assume that, within statins, products with the same active ingredient 
are closer substitutes than products with different active ingredients. Additionally, 
with the random coefficients model it is necessary that prices or other product 
characteristics vary across markets (Nevo, 2000b) and in the dataset there are not 
such variations.    
Drugs are grouped into exhaustive and mutually exclusive active ingredient markets. 
In each of these market, for instance “lovastatin”, there is a set of drugs 
characterized by their strengths, package sizes and manufacturers denoted j = 1, …, 
J. Each set may include brand-name and generic drugs. It is assumed that different 
presentations with the same active ingredient are highly substitutable and may be 
                                                 
8 The nested logit model can be interpreted as a special case of the random coefficients model with 
random coefficients only on segment–specific dummy variables (Berry, 1994). The consumer 
preference for the segment is the only relevant consumer characteristic and it interacts with only 
one product characteristic: the segment to which the product belongs. 
9 For those cases in which the order of the nests is important, Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg 
(1997) developed the principles-of-differentiation general extreme-value model. 
10 The therapeutic groups are formed on the basis of the 4th level of the ATC code that 
approximates the chemical, therapeutic or pharmacological group (e.g., C10AA for statins or HMG 
CoA reductase inhibitors) and the pharmaceutical presentations within a group can be considered 
close substitutes since they have the same active chemical ingredient (5th level of the ATC code, 
e.g., C10AA01 for simvastatin). 
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interchanged; for instance, one daily pill of simvastatin 20 mg with either two pills 
of simvastatin 10 mg or half a pill of simvastatin 40 mg. Finally, the outside good 
represents the alternative: not consuming a statin, and is assumed to be the only 
member of its own group11. 
The physician, jointly with the pharmacist and the patient, chooses a presentation of 
the drug that maximizes utility for the patient, even though the final consumption 
may be affected by the reimbursement and substitution rules and the availability of 
the product at the drugstore. The aggregate demand for each product is obtained by 
summing over the individual choices.  
The indirect utility function of consumer i for consuming the drug j at the period t 
is: 
[ ] ijt
g
igjgjtijt du εσζδ )1( −++= ∑          (1) 
Where jtδ  is the mean utility level of product j, which is the same for all consumers. 
Thus, individual heterogeneity enters the model through the non-deterministic part 
of the utility, ijtig εσζ )1( −+ . Where ijtεσ )1( − is the idiosyncratic taste for drug j and 
igζ is the individual-specific random term, which is interacted with the dummy 
variables for each of the active ingredient markets. In fact, ijtε  is an identically and 
independently distributed extreme value random variable that represents the 
distribution of consumer preferences about the mean utility, jgd is a dummy variable 
                                                 
11 In fact, the outside good also includes the consumption of statins by those individuals with 
private health insurance. 
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that is equal to one for drugs with a specific active ingredient, g, and zero otherwise 
and igζ  is common to all products in market g and has a distribution function that 
depends on the parameter σ, with 0 ≤ σ < 1. As Cardell (1997) proved, an 
additional property of this model is that if ijtε  is an extreme value random variable, 
[ ijtig εσζ )1( −+ ] is also an extreme value random variable.   
The parameter σ measures the within-nest correlation of utility levels and allows 
substitution between products with the same active ingredient to be included. If σ 
approaches 0, the within-group correlation of utility levels is low, and the model 
tends toward the multinomial logit (Besanko, Gupta and Jain, 1998). When σ tends 
toward 1, the within-nest correlation of utilities approaches 1.  
The mean utility, jδ , is equal to: 
jtmjtgjt pX ξωαβγκδ +++++=        (2) 
Where the κ  is a constant term, gγ  is an active ingredient fixed effect, X  is a 
matrix of product characteristics which includes the time of each product in the 
market and a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the product is a generic, α  is the 
price coefficient and β  is a vector of taste parameters to be estimated. jtp  is the 
price per DDD of drug j at time t. I also introduce firm-specific fixed effects, mω , 
that is, a variable that is equal to one for a specific firm across drugs and markets 
and to zero otherwise. jξ  expresses product characteristics that are observable to 
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the physicians, pharmacists or patients, but not to the researcher, such as quality, 
reputation or promotional effort. 
One characteristic of this demand model is that wealth effects are not taken into 
consideration. This would be a problem if the product analysed was a good whose 
price sensitivity depended on level of income, such as a durable good, but this does 
not seem to be the case for statin drugs.  
After the normalization of the utility of the outside good to 0, 00 =δ , and following 
the derivation in Berry (1994), the econometric specification is: 
jtmgtjjtgtjt spXss υωσαβγκ ++++++=− )ln()ln()ln( /0     (3) 
Where jts  and ts0  are the market shares of drug j and the outside good, respectively, 
σ is the parameter that measures the level of correlation between products with the 
same active ingredient, )ln( / gtjs  is the log of the share of product j in the group of 
products with active ingredient g, and jtυ  is an error term. 
Supply 
In the pharmaceutical industry, firms usually produce more than a single drug. I 
assume that firms act as multi-product Bertrand profit maximizers and set their 
prices taking the prices chosen by their competitors as given. Following Nevo 
(2000a and 2001), each firm produces a subset fΓ  of the J products. So, for each 
period, the profits of the firm f are: 
ft
j
jtjtjtft CpMsmcp
ft
−−=Π ∑
Γ∈
)()(        (4) 
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Where )( ps jt  is the market share of product j, which depends on the prices of all 
products, and M is the size of the market, which includes the outside good and 
implicitly defines its size. As highlighted by Nevo (2000a), this definition allows the 
market size to be kept fixed while still allowing an increase in the number of the 
products on the market, since it results in a decrease in the share of the outside 
good12. ftC  is the fixed cost of production and jtmc  is the marginal operating cost, 
which is assumed not to depend on the quantity produced.  
A unique pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with strictly positive prices is 
assumed. Thus, the price jtp  of product j produced by firm f at period t must satisfy 
the following first-order condition: 
0
)(
)()( =
∂
∂
−+ ∑
Γ∈ ftr jt
rt
rtrtjt
p
ps
mcpps        (5) 
These first-order condition equations involve price-costs margins for each drug. 
Bertrand competition in a context of differentiated products, which is the case in 
the pharmaceutical industry, is different from a situation of homogenous products. 
With differentiated products, a firm does not generally lose all of its demand by 
pricing slightly above the competitors’ prices, nor does it steal all rival firms’ 
demand by pricing below their competitors’ prices. Thus, in equilibrium, firms may 
set different prices that exceed the marginal cost and earn positive profits (Baye and 
                                                 
12 If the potential market size (which was defined in section 3 as the amount of DDDs that would 
be consumed if all potential patients took a statin) was reduced, for instance, by considering a lower 
proportion of people with high cholesterol level as potential consumers, it would imply higher 
elasticities of substitution. Since I assume a relatively large market size for the outside good, it will 
generate conservative estimates of substitution. 
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Kovenock, 2008). If products are considered good substitutes, there is more 
competition and prices should tend towards the marginal cost: with less 
differentiation, there is a reduction of markups and prices. For instance, the 
differentiation between brand-name and generic drugs may explain the 
aforementioned “Generic Paradox” found in the US by some authors.  
The markups can be solved for explicitly by defining the following J x J matrix:  
{ }




 Γ⊂∃
∂
∂
−
=Ω
otherwise
jrfif
p
ps
p
ft
jt
rt
jrt
,0
,:,
)(
)(      (6) 
Where the own and cross price elasticities of this one-level nested logit model have 
the following form: 
))1(1(
1
/ jtgtjjtjjt ssp σσσ
αη −−−
−
=  
))1(1(
1
/ rtgtrrtjrt ssp σσσ
αη −−−
−
=       (7) 
ktktjkt spαη −=  
Where j and r are different products with the same active ingredient and k has a 
different one. 
The first-order conditions in (5) can be written in vector notation as: 
0)()( =−Ω− mcpps         (8) 
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Simulation 
If the marginal costs are not observed, they can be computed from the estimates of 
the demand system and (8). However, I follow the opposite approach and obtain 
the vector of prices for each month of 2005 from the inversion of Ω , the market 
shares and a proxy of the marginal costs. Once the own and cross price elasticities 
are computed and Ω  is inverted, I calculate the prices using the following 
expression: 
)(1* psmcp −Ω+=          (9) 
As a proxy for the marginal operating costs, I use the lowest price per DDD 
observed for the 19 markets in August 2010, which is €0.07 for the presentation of 
simvastatin with a dose of 40 mg and 28 tablets. It seems a reasonable marginal cost 
since the prices tend to the marginal cost when there are a considerable number of 
competitors and usually, in regulated markets, some years after the introduction of 
the product. In any case, this price is assumed to be a maximum boundary for the 
marginal cost. Additionally, I compute prices with a marginal cost equal to zero as a 
minimum boundary.  
In this way, I assume that marginal costs are constant across firms and periods. The 
assumption of constant marginal cost of production is common in the literature that 
analyses the pharmaceutical industry. It is also common to assume zero marginal 
cost, since previous observers have claimed that the marginal cost is extremely low, 
even that the level of marginal cost is negligible compared to price (Stern, 1996). 
Therefore, the marginal operating cost per DDD will be €0.07 or zero. 
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For practical purposes I assume that in each period firms set prices taking into 
account their own and competitors’ market shares in the previous month. After 
calculating the simulated prices, I compute the corresponding market share of each 
product for that period with the parameters obtained from the estimation of the 
demand model. With these market shares, I compute the prices of the following 
month in a recursive way and with them the market shares for that period13. 
As an alternative scenario, prices in 2005 are computed only for off-patent drugs14. 
Taking the regulated prices of drugs under patent protection as given, I simulate the 
prices for off-patent products in each period using the previous procedure. Then, I 
recalculate the market shares of all the products, including those with patent 
protection. 
Finally, I simulate a situation of full collusion among all the firms present in the 
market. Thus, in these scenarios each producer considers in its first-order condition 
of profit maximization not only all the products it produces but also its competitors’ 
products. I simulate the prices resulting from this strategy of joint profit-
maximization of all the products, which corresponds to monopoly or perfect price 
collusion, by defining the ownership matrix appropriately and computing the 
corresponding markups (Nevo, 2001). 
                                                 
13 I also assume the same number of entries of firms throughout 2005, which is a small number, 
and that they achieve the same market share in the first month as in the real data. 
14
 The inclusion of all the products in the first counterfactual scenario does not mean that active 
ingredients whose patents have not expired lose their protection, since the entry of new competitors, for 
instance generics, is not simulated. However, these products are under competitive pressure from other 
active ingredients in the same therapeutic group and, as will be seen below, their producers are in a better 
position if they are able to set prices without restrictions when off-patent products can do so. 
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Welfare variation 
In order to evaluate the effects of introducing actual price competition, it is 
necessary to calculate variations in welfare. Welfare is a monetary measure of the 
utilities for the patients of the set of products available, including the outside good, 
minus the price paid by the consumers (the copayment of the patients plus the cost 
for the NHS). 
Some previous work has analysed effects on welfare of the introduction of new 
products (Petrin, 2002; Di Giacomo, 2008). I only compute welfare variations as a 
result of price changes for the same set of products, for which it is necessary that 
there are no welfare variations due to variety effects (Hausman and Leonard, 2002).  
Following Small and Rosen (1981), the surplus per consumer in a discrete-choice 
model may be calculated by integrating over the market share function. Thus, the 
compensating variation measure of a change in prices for a representative consumer 
is equal to: 
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0∫=          (10) 
Where δ0 is the vector of mean utilities calculated with the real prices and δ1 is the 
same vector computed with simulated prices of each of the counterfactual scenarios. 
After integrating the market share formula for the one-level nested logit model 
(Berry, 1994), the following expression is obtained:  
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Where g is the active ingredient subgroup. The total variation in welfare is given by 
multiplying this compensating variation for a representative consumer by the 
potential market size. I use the parameter estimates of the demand model to 
calculate expression (11). 
Finally, since the entry costs are sunk costs and fixed costs are the same under any 
scenario, it is possible to calculate the welfare variation of firms during 2005 as the 
change in variable profits, i.e. the quantity of DDDs sold multiplied by the 
difference between the price per DDD and the assumed marginal cost per DDD. 
5. Econometric estimation 
The quality of the product as well as promotional activities and marketing expenses 
are observable to the consumer, the physician and the pharmacist, but not to the 
researcher. These unobserved factors are correlated with the drug price and with the 
drug’s share within the active ingredient and cause endogeneity.  
To partially overcome this problem, I include firm-specific dummy variables in the 
econometric specification. The role of these fixed effects is to control for time 
invariant factors, which are usually common to all a firm’s products, that is, to 
capture the manufacturers’ mean quality and mean marketing effort, leaving the 
time-specific and product-specific deviations as part of the error term. In fact, the 
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market shares of competing drugs are driven by physicians’ and pharmacists’ 
choices of producer within the market and firms build a reputation and develop 
idiosyncratic skills in launching and delivering drugs.  
So, the remaining potential endogeneity arises from factors that change over time or 
variation between a manufacturer’s products. To deal with this remaining 
inconsistency in the estimation, I use instrumental variables. 
Following the empirical literature on industrial organization (Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes, 1995; Bresnahan, Stern, and Trajtenberg, 1997; and Petrin, 2002) and similar 
papers dealing with the pharmaceutical industry (for instance Iizuka, 2007; or Stern, 
1996), as possible instruments I considered those variables that capture how 
crowded product space is and the ownership structure at different levels of the 
market.    
From the instruments available I chose the set with strongest correlation to the 
endogenous variables that did not reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan-Hansen 
test of exogeneity (Sargan, 1958; and Hansen, 1982). These instruments are: total 
number of products in the active ingredient market; total time in the market of all a 
firm’s products; and total time in the market of all the competitors’ products.  
Additionally, I include the order of entry of each product into the active ingredient 
market as an instrument. In Spain, as Reiffen and Ward (2005) indicated for the US, 
the timing of entries into the market is largely out of the control of firms; they do 
not know the date of approval with certainty, or even if they will obtain approval, 
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neither do they know when, or how many, other applications for that market will be 
approved. Thus, because of the length and uncertainty of the approval process, 
order of entry may reasonably be considered as unrelated to firm-specific 
characteristics. 
I use the (two-stage) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which is the 
method most commonly used in the industrial organization literature following 
Berry (1994), since its estimates are unbiased and consistent. Table 2 contains the 
definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables that are used in the estimation. 
Table 3 shows the GMM estimation of the demand model. The within-active-
ingredient market share is significant and its coefficient is 0.46. This result validates 
the use of the nested logit model as opposed to a simple multinomial logit model, 
since the nested model is only consistent with the random utility maximization 
when this parameter is significant and between 0 and 1.  
There is negative price elasticity since the price per DDD parameter is significant 
and negative. A 1% increase in price reduces the relative statin drug share, that is, 
the weight of the product share over the outside good share, by 3.46%.  
Time in the market has a positive coefficient and is significant. It would seem that 
products that have been on the market longer have more sales than new products.  
The generic dummy variable is significant at the 5% level and has a positive 
parameter. Thus, being a generic product also seems to have a positive effect on the 
quantity of DDDs sold.  
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As expected, the dummy variable for the general withdrawal of cerivastatin until its 
complete disappearance from the market has a significant large negative coefficient. 
The remaining active ingredients, except for lovastatin, have significant dummy 
coefficients in relation to the comparison active ingredient, simvastatin. In fact, 
atorvastatin and fluvastatin have positive and larger values. 
6. Simulation results 
Once the own and cross price elasticities given by (8) are computed and Ω  is 
inverted, I calculate the price of each product for each month of 2005 using (9). As 
proxies for the marginal cost I use the lowest price per DDD observed for the 19 
markets in August 2010 and zero. After calculating the simulated prices I compute 
the corresponding market shares for each product for that month. The 2005 prices 
are also computed only for off-patent drugs, in order to simulate a scenario in which 
there is price competition only among products that are not protected by patents.  
With these counterfactual prices and market shares, which are obtained from a 
competition à la Bertrand, interest lies in the comparison with the real ones, which 
are the result of a competition restricted by price among other regulations.  
Prices and expenditure 
As Table 4 shows, there is a global decline in unrestricted prices15. The weighted 
average real price per DDD is €0.44 for the whole statin market, while the mean 
simulated price goes from €0.18 (when the marginal cost is assumed to be zero) to 
                                                 
15 In order to homogenize comparisons with the real prices and quantities, the real quantities of 
DDDs are obtained from the predictions of the estimated demand model with the real prices and 
the real average prices per DDD are weighted by these predicted quantities.  
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€0.25 (for a marginal cost of 0.07). If there is price competition only between off-
patent drugs, the average prices are €0.21 in the first case and €0.27 in the second. 
Therefore, the price reduction ranges from 39% to 59% depending on the scenario. 
As Table 7 shows, due to the negative price elasticity of demand, there is a slight 
increase of about 4% in the total quantity of DDDs consumed under any scenario. 
However, the price decline is enough to compensate this increase in consumption 
and, as is shown in Table 5, there is a considerable decrease in expenditure, 
especially in those cases where there is no marginal cost. The savings for the NHS 
and patients ranges from 37% to 57%, depending mainly on the marginal cost 
assumption. 
Active ingredients 
Even though there are considerable real price differences between active 
ingredients, once there is unrestricted price competition, prices are quite similar. The 
lowest real price is €0.36 for atorvastatin and the highest is €1.00 for pravastatin. 
When there is competition between all the products and the marginal cost is 
assumed to be €0.07, the price per DDD is €0.24 for fluvastatins and lovastatins, 
€0.25 for simvastatins, and €0.26 for atorvastatins and pravastatins. If the marginal 
cost is assumed to be zero, prices vary between €0.17 and €0.19. 
When the competition is restricted to off-patent products, these drugs have almost 
the same mean prices (in fact they are identical when expressed to two decimals) 
while the products under patent protection (atorvastatin and fluvastatin) have the 
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regulated prices. For that reason, the decline in prices is slightly lower for the whole 
statin market. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the distribution of total sales and market shares among active 
ingredients for each scenario, respectively, and Tables 7 and 8 show the same 
information in terms of quantity of DDDs. The data in these four tables are 
represented in Figures 2 to 516.     
As a consequence of price variations, there are important changes in the total 
amount of DDDs and market shares of active ingredients. On the one hand, in all 
the scenarios there is a large increase in consumption of pravastatins, especially 
when the competition is restricted to off-patent drugs. On the other hand, there are 
large declines in sales of atorvastatins and simvastatins. The consumption of 
fluvastatins and lovastatins are relatively stable and fluctuate depending on the 
assumptions of competition and marginal cost. When the competition is restricted 
to off-patent drugs, the decline in sales of products under protection is greater. 
However, as they have relatively high regulated prices, the revenues they generate 
are less affected than the quantities sold. 
                                                 
16 Due to space limits, variations in the market shares of different presentation (combinations of 
dose, quantity and active ingredient) for the same active ingredient are not reported. Active 
ingredients with considerable variations, in terms of quantities as much as revenues, are 
atorvastatin, fluvastatin and pravastatin. For the first two active ingredients, not only are there 
variations in comparison with the real scenario, but also between the situation in which price 
competition is restricted to off-patent drugs and the one in which it is allowed among all products. 
These results are available upon request. 
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Generics vs. brand-name drugs 
Taking into account that in 2005 there were no atorvastatin and fluvastatin generics 
because of patent protection, with the real prices, the generics market share for the 
whole statin market was 13% in value and 12% in quantity. However, with the 
introduction of price competition there is a clear decline in these market shares. 
When there is price competition between all the products, the generics market share 
is 5% in value and 6% in DDDs, and when there is competition only for off-patent 
products, the market share is 6% in revenue and between 7% and 8% in quantity 
(Tables 9 and 10). This global decline in generic products is represented in Figures 
6 and 7. 
Among active ingredients, whereas the reduction in the generics market share is not 
very high for lovastatin and simvastatin (one percent for lovastatin and three 
percent for simvastatin), it is very marked for pravastatin. In value, the share goes 
from 34% to 5-6%, and in DDDs, from 41% to 6-7%.  
Firms 
As Figures 8 to 12 show, in general terms, the distribution among firms of DDDs 
sold and revenue are slightly more unequal in any of the hypothetical scenarios than 
they are with the real prices. In terms of quantity of DDDs, as mentioned above, 
there is a total increase. However, of the 61 firms active during 2005, only 11 
increase their sales when there is competition among all the products, independently 
of the assumed marginal cost; this becomes 17 or 18 when there is only price 
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competition for off-patent drugs and the marginal cost is €0.07 and zero, 
respectively.  
In terms of revenue, in spite of the growth of demand and due to the general 
decline in prices, there is an overall total reduction. These smaller revenues are more 
concentrated in the hands of some manufacturers, especially for lovastatins and 
pravastatins (Figures 13 to 17). In fact, five of the 61 firms active during 2005 
register an increase in their revenues when there is competition for all the products 
and the marginal cost is €0.07; and three firms do so when there is no marginal cost. 
When competition is restricted to off-patent products, four producers also 
experience increased revenue, independently of the marginal cost. 
The reduction of aggregate revenue that is reported in Table 5 is from 
€44,381,547.88, when there is only price competition among off-patent drugs and 
the assumed marginal cost is €0.07, to €68,609,032.75, when there is competition for 
all the products and the marginal cost is equal to zero.  
The Table 11 shows the change in variable profits among active ingredients and 
overall. The reduction in variable profits is from €31,465,707.95, in the case of price 
competition only among products not protected by patents and a marginal cost of 
€0.07, to €38,196,118.95, when there is competition among all the products and the 
marginal cost is zero. In percentage terms, the variable profits decline by between 
36% and 57%.   
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There is a clear decline in all the active ingredients except for pravastatin, which sees 
an increase in the number of DDDs sold. In fact, pravastatin experiences a large 
increase in variable profits in the two hypothetical scenarios in which the marginal 
cost is assumed to be €0.07. In contrast, the reduction in simvastatin variable profits 
is very large under all the scenarios and especially when the marginal cost is equal to 
zero. For atorvastatin, the decline is also large when the marginal cost is assumed to 
be zero as it is when the marginal cost is equal to €0.07 and all the products 
experience price competition. In the case of lovastatins and fluvastatins, there are 
considerable but smaller reductions of variable profits. 
Consumer welfare 
Table 12 shows the computed changes in the welfare of consumers, understood as 
the NHS (tax-payers) plus the patients, under each scenario. The price reductions 
under all the counterfactual scenarios lead to an increase in surplus. This increase is 
very great when the marginal cost is equal to zero and especially when all the 
products compete with each other, i.e., in cases in which the decline in prices is 
great. The decrease in variable profits is also greater under such scenarios. The net 
effect of the increase in consumers’ welfare and the decline in firms’ profits is clearly 
positive in any situation. The net welfare increase ranges from a maximum of 
€717,343,568.78, when the marginal cost is zero and all the drugs compete, to 
€538,482,214.06, when the marginal cost is €0.07 and only off-patent products 
compete. 
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Regulation and collusion 
As Table 13 shows, average real prices, which are the regulated prices, are very 
close to those obtained from the simulation of a situation of full collusion among all 
the firms in the market (joint profit maximization). For the whole market, the 
weighted mean real price per DDD is €0.44, whereas the weighted mean price 
resulting from perfect collusion ranges from €0.38, when there is competition only 
between off-patent drugs and the marginal cost is assumed to be 0, to €0.48, in the 
scenario where there is competition among all the products and the marginal cost is 
€0.07.  
7. Discussion 
As the estimation results show, the within-active-ingredient market share has a 
significant coefficient of 0.46. Since a value of 1 would indicate a situation of perfect 
correlation among utilities and a value of 0 no degree of possible substitutions at all, 
this value shows a considerable degree of differentiation within the active 
ingredients.  
The price has a negative effect on market share, which means that, even though the 
rate of copayment is quite low in Spain, there is negative price elasticity.  
The time in the market has a positive effect on market share. This result is not 
surprising since in the pharmaceutical market, experience and product reputation are 
appreciated by patients and healthcare professionals, and there is evidence of an 
advantage for the first entrants (Yu and Gupta, 2008). 
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A surprising result is that being a generic drug has a positive effect on market share. 
It is expected that physicians and patients may prefer brand-name medicines, which 
usually have a better reputation. The coefficient of this dummy variable may capture 
the efforts of national and regional health authorities in the promotion of the 
prescription and consumption of generics.  
One limitation of the estimation of the demand model is that the dataset contains 
no characteristics of the patients or other agents and thus demand depends only on 
prices and other attributes of the products. 
Another pitfall of the dataset is that price rebates are not reflected in it. The prices 
used in the estimation, and indeed in the real situation in the simulation, are the 
prices that the NHS actually paid (and the patient when there was a copayment). 
However, there is some evidence of price discounts in Spain (Borrell and Merino, 
2007; Puig-Junoy, 2009), especially for generic medicines, as occurs in other 
regulated pharmaceutical markets (Kanavos and Taylor, 2007). These price rebates 
to pharmacists may distort the estimated price elasticity and the subsequent 
simulations. 
As expected, with the simulation of Bertrand price competition, in comparison to 
the situation of highly regulated prices, there is a notable reduction in prices and, 
although the price elasticity is negative, the increase in consumption is not enough 
to compensate for the lower prices. So there is a considerable reduction in 
expenditure for the whole market. 
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Among active ingredients there are important variations in market share. One 
possible explanation is that under the scenarios of unrestricted price competition 
there are fewer differences between active ingredient prices and the changes in sales 
may correspond to other characteristics.  
Moreover, as the simulations show, when price competition is restricted to off-
patent drugs, the decline in sales of products under protection is greater and the 
overall saving is lower. For this reason, a pro-competitive reform should allow the 
freedom to set prices for both kinds of active ingredients: with and without patent 
protection. This would not mean that the former lose their protection, since there is 
no advance entry for generics. However, it is harder for those active ingredients in a 
given therapeutic group that enter the market later to recover their R+D expenses 
since they experience competitive pressure from older active ingredients in markets 
which may include lower priced generics. On the other hand, their contribution to 
health improvements is usually also relatively small. 
In relation to the reduction of the market share of generics, brand-name producers 
react to the introduction of generics by reducing prices and the generic products 
lose their comparative advantage, which is a lower price. Thus, this effect is 
especially great in those scenarios in which all products compete.  
The reduction in prices shown in the previous section may be understood as the 
capacity to reduce markups from the current regulated prices. This means that if 
rebates are a common strategy of statin producers or wholesalers, the greatest part 
of the markups are captured by retailers. In relation to this point, Puig-Junoy (2009) 
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finds average discounts on the wholesaler price for generic pravastatins and 
simvastatins to be above 50% in Spain. 
In terms of welfare, for the whole market there is a considerable reduction in 
variable profits. On the other hand, the reduction of prices would increase 
consumer surplus notably and the net effect would be clearly positive under any of 
the four scenarios considered. This implies that the liberalization of prices together 
with pro-competitive regulation would increase welfare. 
These results are in line with Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley (2008) whose 
evaluation of the eight top pharmaceutical markets worldwide, which included 
Spain, found that, when generic drugs are on the market, health insurers (such as the 
NHS in Spain) do not capitalize totally or save costs quickly due to the lower prices 
of the generic drugs. One of their explanations is that generic drug prices are closely 
tied to originator brand-name drug prices and that reference pricing reduces generic 
prices but only marginally. In order to benefit from the introduction of generics, 
these authors recommend price competition and avoidance of price-fixing 
regulation that ties generic prices to those of originator brands. 
Additionally, unrestricted price competition may allow discounts to emerge; which 
currently seem to be captured mainly by pharmacists. If this were to happen, the 
saving in costs due to price rebates could benefit the NHS (or tax-payers) and 
patients. With price competition it seems that the main losers would not be the 
producers and wholesalers in general but the retailers.  
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Among manufacturers, those producing mainly generics and active ingredients that 
experience a large reduction in sales, especially simvastatin, would be net losers. In 
contrast, those selling mainly pravastatin would benefit. Moreover, among firms that 
produce the same active ingredient, market shares would be distributed more 
unequally than in the real situation. Similarly to the differences between active 
ingredients, once the price gap is reduced, other characteristics of the manufacturers 
should explain those changes. 
It is important to note that, in the simulated unrestricted price competition 
scenarios, prices are reduced because firms are assumed to compete à la Bertrand 
and not to cooperate. In other words, it is assumed that firms do not collude when 
prices may be freely set. Although collusion is prohibited by Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by the Spanish Law for the 
Defence of Competition (Act 15/2007), the oligopolistic structure of this industry 
may facilitate it. Furthermore, it could be argued that cooperation among producers 
may be relatively high in the pharmaceutical market where a great number of firms 
meet in different markets.  
In some sense, the comparison between the real prices and those obtained in the 
scenarios of perfect collusion between all the producers suggests that the regulation 
of prices may have the same effect as cooperation between firms. For instance, the 
reference pricing system tends to cluster prices at the reference price (Danzon and 
Liu, 1998), which is not always close to the competitive level. This problem may be 
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overcome, at least partially, if the reference price is set as the lowest price in the 
substitution group, as it is in Denmark (Kaiser, Mendez and Rønde, 2010). 
However, the relatively high prices of the real situation may be explained by the 
high prices of entry that are usual in regulated pharmaceutical markets. In the 
simulation it is assumed that firms always play a one-shot game and therefore they 
can modify the prices of their products every month: in each period firms set prices 
taking into account both the fact that they are multi-product firms and the decisions 
of their competitors in each market, in order to maximize profits. Nevertheless, in 
the real situation, producers negotiate introductory prices with health authorities and 
these prices usually remain constant for a long period and decline over time in real 
terms or are reduced with the implementation of cost containment measures.  
Thus, given that price increases are uncommon, the NHS compensates the 
producers with a relatively high introductory price as Ekelund and Persson (2003) 
found for the Swedish market. In other words, the regulation of prices impedes 
penetration strategies, i.e., entry into the market with low prices. For that reason, 
firms usually opt for a skimming strategy, which involves setting a relatively high 
introductory price. This may explain why pravastatin experienced such a great 
increase in market share with price competition. It is a relatively new product with 
the highest average price and so producers have more of a margin over which to 
reduce their prices when there is unrestricted competition and therefore sales 
increase. In fact, fluvastatin, another relatively new product, has the second highest 
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average price and is the only active ingredient, except for pravastatin, that does not 
lose part of its market share. 
Even with the entry of generic medicines for the first time into the statin market in 
November 2000, there is currently only limited price competition. One possible 
explanation is that, as stated by Puig-Junoy (2007), who also analyses the statin 
market in Spain, the decline in the price of brand-name and generic off-patent 
products is associated with arbitrary regulatory decisions as to the period for which 
the product is included in the reference pricing system or the moment at which its 
reference price is revised. Similarly, Puig-Junoy and Moreno-Torres (2010) 
concluded that the Spanish reference pricing system results in very little price 
competition between generic firms and that price reductions are mainly limited to 
specific regulatory measures.  
Moreover, it is possible that companies selling to several countries are reluctant to 
decrease prices in Spain in order to keep high prices in other countries. A low price 
in Spain may reduce the bargaining position of firms when they negotiate prices or 
may even lead to a direct reduction in prices in other countries if they are based on 
foreign prices. For example, the external reference pricing, which imposes a price 
cap based on prices of identical or comparable products in other countries, is 
common in European countries. 
What ever the case, the regulation of prices and the application of cost containment 
measures have not been totally successful in reducing prices and maximizing 
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welfare. In comparison to the scenarios simulated, it seems that regulation 
undermines price competition, as was found by Danzon and Chao (2000).  
 
8. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyses the demand for statin drugs and reports a counterfactual 
exercise in unrestricted price competition in the regulated Spanish pharmaceutical 
market. This comparison between the real and the counterfactual scenarios allows 
me to evaluate the elimination of price rigidity in terms of welfare, and of winners 
and losers. 
The simulations of price competition à la Bertrand under four different scenarios 
indicate that in a situation with freedom to set prices and a pro-competitive 
environment of prices, there would be a general reduction in prices. The price 
reduction for the whole market would range from 39% to 59%, depending on the 
assumptions regarding the products that compete and the marginal cost.  
Due to the negative price elasticity of the demand, there would be an increase in the 
total quantity of DDDs consumed. However, the decline in prices would more than 
compensate for it and there would be a considerable expenditure decrease. The 
savings for the NHS and patients would range from 37% to 57%. 
As a consequence of price variations, there would be important changes in the total 
number of DDDs and market shares among active ingredients. Also, the 
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counterfactual exercise shows a more unequal distribution of sales among producers 
and a general reversal of generic drugs.  
Finally, there would be a global reduction in revenue and, in fact, most firms would 
experience reductions in variable profits. For the market as a whole, the reduction in 
variable profits would range from 36% to 57%. However, the reduction in prices 
would increase consumer surplus and the net effect would be clearly positive under 
all the scenarios.  
Provided that there is no collusion between firms, the liberalization of prices would 
enhance welfare and may cause rebates (which at present seem to be captured 
mainly by retailers) to be reflected in final prices and thus transfer those benefits to 
the NHS (tax-payers) and patients in the form of cost savings. However, it should 
be considered that this would involve not only winners but also losers.   
In conclusion, in comparison to the scenarios simulated, it seems that regulation of 
prices, such as reference pricing, may have a similar effect to cooperation among 
producers and undermine price competition. More freedom to set prices is 
necessary together with a regulatory framework that includes appropriate incentives 
to foster competition. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Drug market  
 
 
Figure 2. Active ingredients: total amount (€) for 2005 
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Figure 3. Active ingredient market shares (€) for 2005 
Active ingredients market shares (amount)
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
Real All (mc=.07) All (mc=0) Off-patent
(mc=.07)
Off-patent
(mc=0)
ATORVASTATIN
FLUVASTATIN
LOVASTATIN
PRAVASTATIN
SIMVASTATIN
 
 
Figure 4. Active ingredients: total quantity (DDDs) for 2005 
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Figure 5. Active ingredient market shares (DDDs) for 2005 
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Figure 6. Brand-name and generic drug market shares (€) for 2005 
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Figure 7. Brand-name and generic drug market shares (DDDs) for 2005 
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Figure 8. Market shares of atorvastatin manufacturers (DDDs) in 2005 
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Figure 9. Market shares of fluvastatin manufacturers (DDDs) in 2005 
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Figure 10. Market shares of lovastatin manufacturers (DDDs) in 2005 
Lovastatin firms market shares
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
0,30
0,35
0,40
0,45
Real All (mc=.07) All (mc=0) Off-patent (mc=.07) Off-patent (mc=0)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
Figure 11. Market shares of pravastatin manufacturers (DDDs) in 2005 
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Figure 12. Market shares of simvastatin producer manufacturers (DDDs) in 2005 
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Figure 13. Market shares of atorvastatin manufacturers (€) in 2005 
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Figure 14. Market shares of fluvastatin manufacturers (€) in 2005 
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Figure 15. Market shares of lovastatin manufacturers (€) in 2005 
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Figure 16. Market shares of pravastatin manufacturers (€) in 2005 
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Figure 17. Market shares of simvastatin manufacturers (€) in 2005 
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Table 1. Sample of drugs 
Active Ingredient 
(ATC code) 
Main indications 
First 
Obs. 
Generic 
entry 
Reference 
pricing 
Presentations 
November 
1997 
- - 10 mg 28 Tablets 
May 
2001 
- - 20 mg 28 Tablets 
May 
2001 
- - 40 mg 28 Tablets 
Atorvastatin 
(C10AA05) 
Dyslipidemia, 
hipercolesterolemia and 
hypertriglyceridemia. 
January 
2003 
- - 80 mg 28 Tablets 
August 
1998 
- - 0.1 mg 28 Tablets 
August 
1998 
- - 0.2 mg 28 Tablets 
October 
2002 
- - 0.3 mg 28 Tablets 
Cerivastatin 
(C10AA06) 
Hipercolesterolemia. 
November 
2000 
- - 0.4 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
1997 
- - 20 mg 28 Capsules 
January 
1997 
- - 40 mg 28 Capsules Fluvastatin 
(C10AA04) 
Dyslipidemia, 
hypercholesterolemia, 
hypertriglyceridemia 
and atherosclerotic. September 
2002 
- - 80 mg 28 Capsules 
January 
1997 
November 
2000 
May 
2002 
20 mg 28 Tablets 
Lovastatin 
(C10AA02) 
Dyslipidemia, 
hypercholesterolemia, 
hyperlipoproteinemia 
and atherosclerotic. 
January 
1997 
December 
2000 
May 
2002 
40 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
1997 
January 
2004 - 10 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
1997 
January 
2004 - 20 mg 28 Tablets Pravastatin 
(C10AA03) 
Dyslipidemia, 
hypercholesterolemia, 
hypertriglyceridemia, 
Atherosclerotic, 
Ischemic 
cardiomyopathy and 
acute myocardial 
infarction. 
February 
1999 
January 
2004 - 40 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
1997 
January 
2002 
January 
2004 
10 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
1997 
January 
2002 
January 
2004 
20 mg 28 Tablets Simvastatin 
(C10AA01) 
Dyslipidemia, 
hypercholesterolemia, 
hypertriglyceridemia, 
Atherosclerotic, 
Ischemic 
cardiomyopathy and 
diabetes. 
September 
1997 
January 
2002 
January 
2004 
40 mg 28 Tablets 
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Table 2. Summary of statistics for the variables in the demand model. 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Product market share 
Product share in the 
potential market 
10981 0.0038 0.0072 0.0000 0.0544 
Outside good market 
share 
Outside good share in 
the potential market 
10981 0.4546 0.2004 0.1833 0.9135 
Price per DDD 
Price per defined 
daily dose (€/DDD) 
10981 0.7880 0.3716 0.1882 1858022 
Within active 
ingredient share 
Generic drug’s 
market share divided 
by the total generic 
market share 
10981 0.0533 0.0908 0.0000 0.8837 
Time in market 
Number of months 
since the entry of the 
generic drug 
10981 5257108 387245 0 181 
Generic 
Dummy equal to one 
for generics; 0 
otherwise 
10981 0.4586 0.4983 0 1 
Cerivastatin 
withdrawal 
Dummy equal to one 
for cerivastatins from 
the withdrawal; 0 
otherwise 
10981 0.0101 0.1000 0 1 
Atorvastatin 
Dummy equal to one 
for atorvastatins; 0 
otherwise 
10981 0.0670 0.2501 0 1 
Cerivastatin 
Dummy equal to one 
for cerivastatins; 0 
otherwise 
10981 0.0387 0.1929 0 1 
Fluvastatin 
Dummy equal to one 
for fluvastatins; 0 
otherwise 
10981 0.0849 0.2787 0 1 
Lovastatin 
Dummy equal to one 
for lovastatins; 0 
otherwise 
10981 0.2325 0.4224 0 1 
Pravastatin 
Dummy equal to one 
for pravastatins; 0 
otherwise 
10981 0.1616 0.3681 0 1 
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Table 3. Demand model estimation. 
 Coefficient Std. Error
♦
 
Log(Within active 
ingredient share) 
0.4580*** 0.1049 
Log(Price per 
DDD) 
-3.4569*** 0.2431 
Time in market 0.0105*** 0.0017 
Generic 0.5621** 0.2611 
Cerivastatin 
withdrawal 
-7.5984*** 0.2670 
Atorvastatin 4.8069*** 1.0194 
Cerivastatin 4.1433*** 1.1738 
Fluvastatin 3.0647*** 0.7986 
Lovastatin -1.0277*** 0.1404 
Pravastatin 0.9457*** 0.1793 
Constant -4.6815***    1.2116 
Observations 10981 
R2 0.8392 
Sargan-Hansen 
statistic (p-value)    
0.0680 
(0.7950) 
Note: Fixed firm effects are not shown but are included in the estimation. ♦ Robust clustered standard errors. ** and *** 
= significant at the 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4. Active ingredients: weighted average prices (€/DDD) for 2005 
 
 Real All Off-patent 
  MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Atorvastatin 0.36 0.26 0.19 0.36 0.36 
Fluvastatin 0.77 0.24 0.17 0.77 0.77 
Lovastatin 0.55 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.17 
Pravastatin 1.00 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.19 
Simvastatin 0.37 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.18 
Statins 0.44 0.25 0.18 0.27 0.21 
 
 
Table 5. Active ingredients: total amount (€) for 2005 
 
 Real All Off-patent 
  MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Atorvastatin 36324392 18755274 13691786 11637822 9415679 
Fluvastatin 5603596 3809753 2720561 1795859.125 1452968.125 
Lovastatin 9572070 3120487 2224253.25 3971503 2909934.25 
Pravastatin 22710510 34466320 25161054 43889544 32988476 
Simvastatin 46990844 12194016 8794725 15525136 11498549 
Statins 121201412.00 72345850.00 52592379.25 76819864.13 58265606.38 
Total variation 
(∆%)  
-48855562.00 
(-40.31%) 
-68609032.75 
(-56.61%) 
-44381547.88 
(-36.62%) 
-62935805.63 
(-51.93%) 
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Table 6. Active ingredient market shares (€) for 2005 
 
 Real All Off-patent 
  MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Atorvastatin 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.15 0.16 
Fluvastatin 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Lovastatin 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Pravastatin 0.19 0.48 0.48 0.57 0.57 
Simvastatin 0.39 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.20 
 
 
 
Table 7. Active ingredients: total quantity (DDDs) for 2005 
 
 Real All Off-patent 
  MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Atorvastatin 100779872 72863240 73058784 32292750 26126828 
Fluvastatin 7247525 15664540 15706754 2323378.50 1879782 
Lovastatin 17378418 12888991 12923670 16428957 16910576 
Pravastatin 22783328 133904352 134261536 169790880 174895072 
Simvastatin 125385152 48900064 49031480 62408512 64301640 
Statins 273574295 284221187 284982224 283244477.50 284113898.00 
Total variation 
(∆%)  
10646892.00 
(3.89%) 
11407929.00 
(4.17%) 
9670182.50 
(3.53%) 
10539603 
(3.85%) 
 
 
 
Table 8. Active ingredient market shares (DDDs) for 2005 
 
 Real All Off-patent 
  MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Atorvastatin 0.37 0.26 0.26 0.11 0.09 
Fluvastatin 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Lovastatin 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Pravastatin 0.08 0.47 0.47 0.60 0.62 
Simvastatin 0.46 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.23 
 
 
Table 9. Brand-name and generic drug market shares (€) for 2005 
 
All Off-patent 
  Real 
MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Brand-name 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Lovastatin 
Generic 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Brand-name 0.66 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 
Pravastatin 
Generic 0.34 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Brand-name 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Simvastatin 
Generic 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Brand-name 0.87 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 
Statins 
Generic 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
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Table 10. Brand-name and generic drug market shares (DDDs) for 2005 
 
All Off-patent 
  Real 
MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Brand-name 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Lovastatin 
Generic 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Brand-name 0.59 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 
Pravastatin 
Generic 0.41 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Brand-name 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Simvastatin 
Generic 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Brand-name 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 
Statins 
Generic 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 
 
 
Table 11. Variations in variable profits (€) in 2005 
 
 All Off-patent 
 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Atorvastatin -16840717.84 -22632608.00 -23095765.05 -26908714.75 
Fluvastatin -1793843.03 -2883035.17 -3807736.97 -4150627.93 
Lovastatin -6451582.76 -7347816.50 -5600566.89 -6662135.55 
Pravastatin 11755809.94 2450544.29 21179033.42 10277965.55 
Simvastatin -34796828.15 -38196118.95 -31465707.95 -35492295.07 
Total variation 
(∆%) 
-48127161.83 
(-40.49%) 
-68609034.33 
(-56.61%) 
-42790743.44 
(-36.00%) 
-62935807.75 
(-51.93%) 
 
 
Table 12. Variation in welfare (€) in 2005 
 
 All Off-patent 
 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Consumers surplus 669688171.48 785952603.11 552526000.62 655479835.08 
Firms’ profits -16290016.45 -68609034.33 -14043786.56 -62935807.75 
Net variation 653398155.03 717343568.78 538482214.06 592544027.33 
 
 
Table 13. Active ingredients: weighted average full collusion prices (€/DDD) for 2005 
 
 Real All Off-patent 
  MC = 0.07 MC = 0 MC = 0.07 MC = 0 
Atorvastatin 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.36 0.36 
Fluvastatin 0.77 0.48 0.41 0.77 0.77 
Lovastatin 0.55 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.38 
Pravastatin 1.00 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.38 
Simvastatin 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.38 
Statins 0.44 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.38 
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